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Information defi ciencies play an important role in contract enforcement. Courts frequently refuse 
to enforce contractual terms when one of the parties lacks information. The diffi cult question is 
where the line is drawn (or should be drawn) between information defi ciencies of which the law 
will take account and those which it will disregard. This article sets out the economic framework 
for determining when it is appropriate to shift responsibility for information defi ciencies from 
one contracting party to the other. The overriding objective from an economic perspective is to 
ensure that the party who can produce and reveal information at least cost produces the optimal 
amount of honest information in society. The economic duty-to-inform doctrine provides simple 
rules to achieve that purpose. Greater intervention on the basis of information defi ciency is 
warranted in cases where a special relationship of trust exists between contracting parties. 
The reason for this is that an adviser (agent) in a  trust relationship is contractually bound by a 
greater duty to inform the principal, including a duty to provide information and advice about 
the principal’s needs. The economic theory on which judicial control and regulation of contract 
terms rests (and which also limits its scope of applicability) is that people tend to sign contracts 
without reading them.
1 Introduction
The premises of economics push in the direction of freedom of contract, and this current can be resisted 
only with diffi culty. If parties are rational, they will enter contracts only when it is in their self-interest, and 
they will agree only to terms that make them better off. Courts that refused to enforce these terms would 
make it more diffi cult for future parties to use contracts to enhance their joint well-being. Therefore, courts 
should enforce the terms of the contract.1
Under the principle of freedom of contract, courts are required to enforce the contractual 
terms that are the result of a voluntary agreement between contracting parties. This rule 
is benefi cial for society, because it protects individual autonomy and enhances welfare 
by facilitating the realisation of preferences through the use of contractual exchanges.
 And yet, courts do not always enforce (the terms of) contracts. They often refuse to 
enforce terms that seem unfair, that is to say, terms that signifi cantly disadvantage one 
of the parties. Widespread judicial scrutiny of transactions can interfere with freedom of 
contract and may be perceived as a form of paternalism, because it runs counter to the 
notion that people themselves know best what is in their own interests. How do courts 
justify interferences with freedom of contract? Interferences are commonly based on: 
(1) lack of information or (2) inequality of bargaining power.
 Lack of information often plays a role in a court’s decision not to enforce the contract. 
Courts sometimes decide that a contract is unfair because one party was improvident, 
ignorant, inexperienced or unsophisticated. Lack of information plays a role in all 
of these cases. Long-standing doctrines of fraud and mistake deal with information 
problems at the pre-contractual stage. Courts may invalidate a contract when one 
party was imperfectly informed or mistaken about a relevant aspect of the contractual 
exchange. Even the doctrine of incompetence deals with a particular type of information 
problem, namely that incompetent persons, like children, lack information about their 
own needs and preferences. Courts relieve parties from their contractual obligations to 
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protect them against their own ignorance or lack of information. But, in doing so, the 
consequences of the mistake or ignorance of one contracting party are shifted to the 
other party who relied on the contract’s validity.
 Information defi ciency plays an important role in contract enforcement, although 
it matters in some cases but not in others. Courts sometimes relieve individuals of the 
responsibility for their apparent choices, but in other cases they will not allow a person 
to avoid his contractual obligations because he was imperfectly informed. It is not 
always clear where the dividing line is to be drawn between information defi ciencies of 
which the law will take account and those which it will disregard.
 This article sets out the economic framework for determining when it is appropriate 
to shift responsibility for information defi ciencies from one contracting party to the 
other.
 Modern economic analysis does not presuppose that people are perfectly informed 
and that they make perfect decisions. Instead, it is recognised that decision-making is 
costly and that acquiring and processing information (including information about one’s 
own needs and preferences) may be costly. An overview of pre-contractual information 
costs appears in section 2. Moreover, market forces may not be strong enough to cure 
information problems. Legislative or judicial intervention may then be needed to solve 
these problems in order to avoid the resulting misallocation of resources. The legal duty 
to inform is an appropriate legal instrument for solving information problems.
 The economic purpose of a legal duty to inform is to overcome information 
asymmetries by giving incentives to market actors to produce and reveal more – and 
more honest – information. The diffi culty lies in determining the precise extent of the 
duty to inform. From an economic perspective, the question is how to ensure that the 
party who can produce and reveal information at least cost produces and conveys the 
optimal amount of honest information in society. The economic duty-to-inform doctrine, 
described in section 3, provides simple rules to achieve that purpose.
In many legal systems, courts are more willing to relieve a party from disadvantageous 
contractual obligations if the parties are in a special relationship of trust. In section 4, 
it is argued that greater intervention on the basis of information defi ciency is warranted 
when parties are in such a special relationship. The reason is that an adviser (agent) in 
a trust relationship is contractually bound by a greater duty to inform. Various legal 
rules and doctrines may be understood as providing incentives to the adviser in a trust 
relationship to give more – and more honest – information, including information about 
the other party’s (principal’s) needs.
 Lack of information is one reason for courts to interfere with freedom of contract; 
inequality of bargaining power is another one. Courts sometimes decide that a contract 
is unfair because of the unequal bargaining power of the seller and the buyer and that 
this inequality may justify avoidance of the contract. Nonetheless, economists typically 
argue that courts should not avoid contracts because of the unequal bargaining power of 
the parties. The reason is that inequality of bargaining power, which may exist in various 
forms, including contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, could not account for 
the prevalence of harsh contract terms that are not desired by the parties. The unequal 
bargaining power argument for interference with freedom of contract and the counter-
arguments given by economists are outlined in section 5.
 The economic theory on which judicial control of contract terms rests is that people 
tend to sign contracts without reading them. The causes of the signing-without-reading 
problem, the ineffi ciencies resulting from it and its implications for the standard of 
judicial control, its scope of application and the applicable form of legislative action are 
the subject of section 6.
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2 Imperfect Information and the Formation of Contracts
2.1 Introduction
In early economic analyses, information problems were assumed away. A strong version 
of the rational choice model was used, according to which it is assumed that individuals 
are perfectly informed and make perfect decisions. However, in modern economic 
studies, weaker versions of the rational choice model are used. The weaker versions 
of the rational choice model do not presuppose zero costs of acquiring and processing 
information or zero decision costs.2 In extreme cases, involving incompetence, 
information and decision costs may be so high that a person is no longer able to look 
after his own best interest.
 In a world in which all information could be produced and made available at no cost, 
contracting parties would be perfectly informed. However, in the real world, producing 
and communicating information is costly. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
information costs at the pre-contractual stage. However, the fact that producing and 
communicating information is costly does not necessarily imply that an insuffi cient 
amount of information is available in markets. Market forces exist that remedy 
information problems. However, as shown in section 2.3, market forces are generally 
not strong enough to solve all information problems. Legal measures may be needed to 
ensure that the optimal amount of honest information is produced in society.
2.2 Pre-Contractual Information Costs
2.2.1 Information Production Costs and Communication Costs
When people contemplate the possibility of concluding a contract, they need 
information on many issues in order to be able to assess the value of the exchange. 
Producing information is costly. Moreover, because information is asymmetrically 
distributed, parties need to exchange information. Costs need to be incurred to convey 
and communicate information from one contracting party to the other. De Geest gives 
an overview of the pre-contractual information and communication costs:3
 - search costs: people need information on potential contractual partners and 
on the products and services they supply;
 - information on the characteristics or attributes of the product;
 - information on the characteristics of the producer: this type of information 
is especially important for contracts intuitu personae;
 - information on the potential circumstances surrounding the contract: 
complete and perfect contracts require information about all future states 
of the world in order to allocate risks appropriately;
 - information about one’s own needs and preferences: a person’s willingness 
to pay depends on his ability to pay, which includes information about his 
own fi nancial situation and possibilities;
 - information on the production costs: this information is needed by the 
producers in order to calculate the price, as well as by consumers, who 
need to know at what price they could produce the relevant products and/
or services themselves;
 - information about alternative contracting parties on the market: this 
includes information on the market price and the market demand curve;
2 G. Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961) 69 Journal of Political Economy 213.
3 G. De Geest, Economische analyse van het contracten- en quasi-contractenrecht (Economic analysis 
of contract and quasi-contract law) (1994) at 82-88.
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 - information on the applicable law: information about default rules, 
mandatory rules and rules of evidence; and
 - information on the actual terms included in the contract.
2.2.2 Decision Costs
People have to make decision costs. In other words, they need to invest an amount of 
cognitive effort to think through the options and select the product that meets their needs 
and desires best. People often have to invest a signifi cant amount of cognitive energy 
into making sure that they have thought through their options and selected a product that 
meets their needs and desires.
2.2.3 Lie Costs and Verifi cation Costs
Market actors may invest a huge amount of effort to mislead other parties. They may 
try to ‘hide’ negative aspects of a product or ‘infl ate’ its positive aspects. The costs of 
producing false information are ‘lie costs’. These are a waste of resources because they 
create no value.4
 The lie costs of some parties may lead to verifi cation costs of other parties.5 Because 
some parties do not reveal information in an honest manner, trust levels may decrease. 
People will spend resources on verifying whether the information given to them is 
correct and honest. Verifi cation costs are a waste of resources because information will 
unnecessarily be duplicated when it turns out that the information originally provided 
was in fact correct.
 It is not always possible to verify whether information given by one party is false or 
honest. A distinction must be made between verifi able and non-verifi able information.6 
Non-verifi able information consists of subjective opinions or statements about which 
there is no scientifi c consensus. For example, when a car dealer declares that ‘Toyota is 
the best’, it is impossible for third parties to determine whether the costs involved in this 
statement are to be classifi ed as information costs or as lie costs.
2.3 Market Forces to Remedy Information Problems
It is sometimes argued in the economic literature that competitive market forces are 
strong enough to provide the optimal amount of information, thereby removing the need 
to have legal rules to overcome information asymmetries. It is true that market forces 
may cure informational problems through voluntary disclosure of information, but it 
does not make legal rules unnecessary. In any case, it takes time for market forces to 
solve informational problems. Legal rules may speed up the process.
 Moreover, market solutions may not be perfect. Take the example of warranties.7 
Competitive pressures make sellers offer warranties (enforceable guarantees) for 
particular characteristics of their products. A warranty is a guarantee of results and 
therefore an indirect statement on quality, but it is an imperfect solution. The reason 
for this is that a seller who provides a warranty also has to bear the losses resulting 
from events that he cannot know (external factors) and from the buyer’s (non-verifi able) 
moral hazard. Signalling is another way in which markets may overcome informational 
problems.8 However, signalling is also imperfect, because it may induce people to invest 
too much in signalling.
4 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1992) at 110.
5 De Geest, above n. 3, at 87.
6 Id., at 86.
7 S.J. Grossman, ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality’ 
(1981) 24 Journal of Law and Economics 461.
8 A. Spence, ‘Job-Market Signaling’ (1973) 87 Quarterly Journal of Economics 355.
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 In addition, market forces only provide solutions under certain conditions. For 
example, sellers have incentives to provide information to otherwise uninformed buyers, 
but only when the benefi ts of doing so outweigh the costs of information disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure can sometimes be expected, since it will be to the advantage of 
various sellers to point out that their product or service has attributes that are more 
advantageous to many consumers than the product or service of their competitors. 
The principal situation in which voluntary disclosure of information will not occur is 
where the revelation of information would tend to cause many consumers not to buy 
the product at all. No seller of the product will have an incentive to disclose that kind 
of information. Sellers will also not reveal information that makes a particular product 
more attractive than consumers expect if other sellers of such products would also gain 
from that information. Gabaix and Laibson9 present a model of consumer myopia that 
explains why fi rms often shroud the negative attributes of their products, particularly 
high prices for complementary add-ons. They show that competition will not induce 
fi rms to reveal information that would improve market effi ciency. Firms will not educate 
the public about the add-on market, even when unshrouding is free. The reason for this 
is a phenomenon that they call ‘the curse of debiasing’. Debiasing improves consumer 
welfare, but no fi rm can capture or even partially share these benefi ts. Educating a 
consumer about competitors’ add-on schemes effectively teaches that consumer how to 
profi tably exploit those schemes, thereby making it impossible for the educating fi rm to 
profi tably attract the newly educated consumers.
 Finally, in some situations in which there is a good deal of voluntary disclosure, 
the information may not be stated in a standardised manner and therefore does not 
facilitate comparative shopping. Legislative intervention may be needed to ensure that 
information is presented in a standardised way.
 In general, market forces are not strong enough to perfectly solve asymmetric 
information problems. Regulation is required through legislation or in the form of 
general contract doctrines.
3 The Legal Duty to Inform
3.1 Introduction
The presumption that an exchange is value-maximising is valid only when there is no 
force, fraud, mistake or incompetence. For example, the fact that parties accept the offer 
is no evidence that the sale will increase value if one or both of the parties are mistaken 
or imperfectly informed about the object or terms of the exchange.
 Cases in which one of the contracting parties is imperfectly informed about relevant 
aspects of the contract are addressed in law through the doctrines of mistake and fraud 
and through the legal duty to inform. When a person’s consent has been vitiated by 
a mistake (or fraud), courts may invalidate the contract. In doing so, a person who 
has made a mistake is able to shift the consequences to the other party: the costs that 
the other party has made in relying upon the validity of the contract will be wasted 
and he will lose whatever benefi t he expected to obtain from the contractual exchange. 
However, all legal systems agree that not every mistake entitles a promisor to evade 
the consequences of his promise. The diffi culty with which legal systems must cope is 
where to draw the dividing line between mistakes of which the law will take account 
and those which it will disregard.
 Under the will or autonomy-based theory of contract, legal enforcement of contracts 
is justifi ed in order to respect the autonomous will of people. Consequently, there is no 
justifi cation to grant legal force to contracts that do not refl ect the true and free will of 
people. A party whose will or intention is vitiated by a mistake (or deceit or duress) can 
claim that the contract is void. However, it has also been recognised in law that, as a 
basis for contractual enforcement, the ‘will theory’ would create too much uncertainty 
9 X. Gabaix and D. Laibson, ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in 
Competitive Markets’ (2006) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 505.
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in any transaction. A perfectly voluntary or free will is elusive. Legal systems therefore 
also take into account the other contracting party’s reasonable reliance on the validity 
of the contract. Not every mistake entitles a promisor to evade the consequence of his 
promise.
 Nevertheless, there is no simple test in law to tell us in which of these cases the 
contract can be avoided by the mistaken party and in which it cannot. However, based 
on the law and economics literature concerning information imperfections, De Geest 
and Kovac have developed an economic duty-to-inform doctrine that provides simple 
rules for cases involving mistake, fraud and information imperfections in general.10
3.2 The Economic Duty-to-Inform Doctrine
When one contracting party is mistaken or imperfectly informed about an aspect of the 
contract, including his own reasons for contracting, it can no longer be presumed that 
the contract is value-maximising. However, De Geest and Kovac start by saying that 
the mere fact that a party is imperfectly informed should not be a reason to invalidate 
the contract.11 The reason for this is that parties never have perfect information at the 
time of contracting. They have always more information ex post than ex ante. In this 
sense, they are always mistaken. If every mistake would be a valid reason to avoid the 
contract, no contract would ever be binding. The costs of opportunistic behaviour would 
increase if contracts could be set aside too easily: a party that has the right to avoid the 
contract could threaten to use this right in order to induce the other party to agree to a 
change in the terms of the original contract in favour of the threatening party. Moreover, 
the invalidation of a contract is costly. The transaction costs that were incurred for the 
conclusion of the invalidated contract are wasted, and additional transaction costs need 
to be incurred to contract for the transfer of the returned goods to another party. Sellers 
who know that part of the contracts they conclude could be avoided at the wish of buyers 
will seek compensation for these costs by charging higher product prices to consumers 
who are careful as well as those who are not. This may result in adverse selection. Some 
of the careful consumers will refrain from buying products because they are unwilling 
to pay extra for the right to avoid the contract.
 From an economic perspective, rules should be designed to ensure that the party who 
can produce and reveal information at least cost produces the optimal amount of honest 
information in society.
 Economically optimal rules give incentives to the least-cost information gatherer 
to produce and communicate information.12 In most cases, sellers are the least-cost 
information gatherer. The reason for this is that they often acquire information as a 
by-product of owning and using the product (e.g. sellers know that the house they are 
selling has latent defects), that they have economies of scale in producing information 
or that they are more likely to be professionals than buyers (e.g. an antique dealer knows 
whether the object he is selling is an authentic antique or a mere copy).13 If a buyer is 
mistaken or imperfectly informed about an attribute of the exchanged object for which 
the seller is the least-cost information gatherer, the seller should be sanctioned for not 
having produced and revealed the pertinent information to the buyer. The sanction may 
consist of the invalidation of the contract or a price reduction.
 While sellers are the least-cost information gatherer in most cases, they are not so in 
all cases. In nearly all cases, the buyer is the least-cost information gatherer about his 
own wants, needs and preferences.14 Posner argues that there should be no duty for sellers 
to disclose when only the consumer has the requisite information. This is the case, for 
10 G. De Geest and M. Kovac, ‘The Formation of Contracts in the Draft Common Frame of Reference’ 
(2009) European Review of Private Law 113.
11 Id., at 120.
12 A. Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’ (1978) Journal of Legal 
Studies 1.
13 De Geest and Kovac, above n. 10, at 113-132.
14 An exception exists for parties who are in a relationship of trust. Here, the seller (agent) is explicitly 
asked to give advice on the needs of the buyer (principal).
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example, when the performance of the product depends on the consumer’s tastes, which 
may not be known to the manufacturer: ‘Only the consumer knows whether the sweater 
is soft enough, the cantaloupe ripe enough – for him.’15 A person who is mistaken about 
his own needs, motives or reasons for contracting should not be entitled to invalidate the 
contract. Examples of this include a person who decides to make a particular purchase 
because of an error in his own calculations or a person who buys one hundred bottles of 
water for a birthday party because he mistakenly thinks that his guests are teetotallers. 
This lack of intervention in contracts in cases where a buyer is mistaken about certain 
aspects on which he is the least-cost information gatherer, encourages people to act with 
prudence and to become optimally informed about their needs before contracting.
 Hence, from an economic perspective, the question of liability for non-disclosure 
should turn on which of the parties to the transaction, seller or buyer, can produce, 
convey or obtain the pertinent information at the lowest cost.16 However, there are cases 
in which neither party is able to produce the information at a reasonable cost.17 In that 
case, analytically speaking, there is no longer an information problem but a problem 
of risk allocation.18 Who should bear the risk that something happens that makes 
performance more or less valuable to the buyer? For example, who should bear the risk 
that the purchase of a wedding dress in anticipation of a wedding becomes less valuable 
if the wedding is cancelled? From an economic point of view, the superior risk bearer 
should bear that risk. The superior risk bearer is the party who is in the best position to 
prevent the risk from materialising (precaution) or is better able to insure against the risk 
(superior insurer).
 There are limitations on the duty to inform when viewed from an economic 
perspective.19 The fi rst limitation is that information should not be communicated if the 
other party already has or should have the information concerned (e.g. in the case of 
clearly visible defects). It would be a waste of resources if a party had to incur costs to 
communicate information that the other party already has in its possession. The second 
limitation is that information should not be communicated if the information production 
and communication costs exceed the value of the information to the other party. Third, 
there should be no duty to reveal entrepreneurial information. Entrepreneurial information 
is costly to produce, valuable to third parties and is not protected under intellectual 
property laws. The rule that a person may conceal entrepreneurial information preserves 
incentives to invest in the production of entrepreneurial information by allowing the 
investor to obtain returns on his investment. Fourth, there should be no duty to be honest 
about non-verifi able information. A subjective statement may refl ect an honest opinion 
or it may be a lie. However, third parties, like courts, are unable to fi nd out whether the 
person who made the subjective statement gave his honest opinion or told a lie.
3.3 Rules on Mistake in the Draft Common Frame of Reference
The previous paragraph describes the economically optimal doctrine. It does not describe 
existing laws and doctrines. It is not within the aim of this article to carry out a thorough 
analysis of existing national laws and doctrines with a view to determining whether they 
allocate liability for information defi ciencies in similar ways as the economic duty-to-
inform doctrine. However, in what follows, I will briefl y investigate whether the general 
rules on mistake in the Draft Common Frame of Reference contain elements that may 
be considered relevant from an economic perspective in determining whether a duty to 
inform should exist, such as the relative costs of information. The Draft Common Frame 
of Reference provides principles, defi nitions and model rules of European private law. 
15 Posner, above n. 4, at 112.
16 Id., at 111.
17 The costs of producing information are not reasonable from an economic perspective when marginal 
information production costs are higher than marginal ignorance costs.
18 De Geest and Kovac, above n. 10, at 120.
19 Id., at 123-124.
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These model rules, with comments and notes, bring together rules derived from the 
legal systems of the EU member states and the overarching Community law.20
 Article II. – 7:201 DCFR on mistake ‘seeks to set out principles which strike a fair 
balance between the voluntary nature of contract and protecting reasonable reliance by 
the other party. It does not purport to lay down rules which are “common principles” 
to be found in different laws, though it refl ects what is found in many of them.’21 The 
principle laid down in Article II. – 7:201 DCFR is that a party may avoid a contract for 
mistake when the other party has not acted in good faith, has taken deliberate advantage 
or has behaved carelessly but that a party may not avoid a contract for mistake when 
the mistake was inexcusable in the circumstances. As such, the question of liability for 
mistake under the DCFR turns on which one of the parties is to blame for the mistake. 
The text of this article does not explicitly mention that the blameworthiness of the 
parties is a matter of their relative information costs, which is the determining factor 
according to the economic duty-to-inform doctrine.
 Comment E on Article II. – 7:201 DCFR specifi es that ‘a party should not normally 
be permitted to remain silent, with the deliberate intention of deceiving the other party, 
on some point which might infl uence the other party’s decision on whether or not to 
enter the contract.’22 The following illustration is given: 
A sells her house to B without revealing to B that A knows there is extensive rot under the fl oor of one room. 
She does not mention it because she assumes B will be aware of the risk of it from the fact that there are 
damp marks on the wall and will have the fl oor checked. B does not appreciate the risk and buys the house 
without having the fl oor checked. B may avoid the contract.23 
The outcome of this case corresponds with that implied by economic analysis. Party A 
has at little or no costs acquired information that the other obviously does not have and 
which is crucial to the contract. To obtain this information herself, Party B would have 
to check the fl oor, most likely by hiring an expert, which involves substantial costs. In 
this case, Party A is the least-cost information gatherer, and the cheapest way in which 
Party B may become informed is to oblige Party A to reveal to Party B what Party A 
already knows, namely by imposing upon A a duty to inform that there is rot under the 
fl oor. The sanction for non-disclosure is that Party B may avoid the contract. Requiring 
Party B to be aware of potential defects and to incur costs to investigate the property 
would be a more costly and less effi cient solution. The outcome of the case given as an 
illustration in Comment E corresponds to that implied by economic analysis, but in the 
comment the outcome is obtained through application of the general legal principle of 
good faith, not by applying economic reasoning.
 Comment E further specifi es that silence is incompatible with good faith unless 
there is a good reason for allowing the party to remain silent, for example ‘when the 
knowledgeable party has only gained the knowledge at considerable expense, or in highly 
competitive commercial situations.’24 This exception to the general rule corresponds 
with the exception for entrepreneurial information included in the economic duty-to-
inform doctrine.
3.4 Implications of Behavioural Insights
Legal scholars are increasingly making use of existing scholarship in both cognitive 
psychology and behavioural economics, which suggests that human behaviour often 
deviates from rational choice in systematic and predictable ways, to explain legal 
phenomena and to argue for legal reforms.25 Numerous tests done by psychologists 
and experimental economists have shown that people often do not exhibit the kind 
20 C. Von Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Defi nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: 
Draft Common Frame of Reference, Volume I (2010) at 1.
21 Id., at 457.
22 Id., at 460.
23 Id., at 460.
24 Id., at 460.
25 C. Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and R. Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 
Stanford Law Review 1471-1550.
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of reasoning ascribed to agents in rational choice models, particularly with regard 
to decisions made in the face of uncertainty and risk. Psychologists hypothesise that 
subjects make systematic errors by using decision ‘heuristics’, or rules of thumb, 
which fail to accommodate the full logic of a decision. These systematic errors are 
often referred to as ‘biases’, and this general topic often carries the label ‘heuristics and 
biases’. The study of heuristics and biases tends to be dominated by attempts to expose 
systematic errors in human judgment and decision-making.26
 For example, the principal concern with regard to credit borrowing is the cognitive bias 
for risk underestimation and irrational discounting (myopia). This is an acute problem in 
credit borrowing, because the repayment terms for typical debt products usually stretch 
out for years. Compounding this problem is a complex pricing structure, which often 
makes credit borrowing diffi cult to price.27 Accordingly, one of the problems is that 
debtors often cannot appreciate what they are getting themselves into: unserviceable 
levels of debt. If debtors make systematic errors in judgment due to risk underestimation, 
myopia or some other psychological impediment, then they will make bad choices and 
do themselves harm, for example by taking out unaffordable credit, if left to their own 
devices. The problem is aggravated when sophisticated lenders strategically exploit 
the consumer’s behavioural biases by designing and shaping contracts around the 
consumers’ systematic deviations from perfect rationality. According to Bar-Gill, such 
biased contracting is not the consequence of imperfect competition. On the contrary, 
competitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumer’s weaknesses.28 In the 
borrowing context, lenders may adopt a particular business model, called the sweatbox 
model, which is a two-stage model that entices all borrowers at the outset with low 
rates but then cranks up the heat through late payment fees and penalty rates for the 
‘sweaters’. The way lenders lure debtors into their sweatbox is by preying upon their 
underestimation of risk and optimism biases.29
 The behavioural account of consumer contracting, which is based on models 
of consumer markets in which sophisticated fi rms interact with boundedly rational 
consumers and consumers who may have psychological biases, may be used to 
explain specifi c legal rules. For example, under the EU Consumer Credit Directive, 
creditors bear the responsibility of individually checking the creditworthiness of the 
consumer.30 This rule may be considered as an exception to the general assumption that 
each person is in the best position to assess whether a particular purchase is affordable 
based on personal information regarding a person’s ability to pay. For example, when 
an individual consumer buys a television set, it is generally the consumer who is better 
situated than the electronics store to know whether the purchase is affordable. This 
presumption may be reversed in the borrowing context when consumer biases are taken 
into account. Consumers (debtors) are thought to be worse decision-makers than lenders 
when it comes to borrowing money. Lenders are thought to have a better idea of how 
much money a given debtor can afford to pay on a monthly basis without suffering 
fi nancial distress. The reason is that debtors suffer from psychological impediments that 
may be debiased in the professional lending setting by creditors with superior cognitive 
26 P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, ‘Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of 
Information Processing in Judgment’ (1971) 6 Organizational Behavior & Human Performance 649-744; 
A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 
1124-1131.
27 One particular mistake that may lead to ‘incorrect’ pricing is called ‘use-pattern mistake’. People often 
misperceive their future use of the product. For example, they underestimate the likelihood of paying late 
on their credit card bills. See O. Bar-Gill, ‘Bundling and Consumer Misperception’ (2006) 72 University 
of Chicago Law Review 33; O. Bar-Gill, ‘The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’ (2008) 92 
Minnesota Law Review 749.
28 O. Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic’ (2004) 98 Northwestern University Law Review 1373.
29 J.A.E. Pottow, ‘Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending’ (2007) University of Illinois Law 
Review 405 at 416.
30 Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, OJ 2008 L 133/66. 
According to Article 8 (Obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer) of the Directive: 
‘Member States shall ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor assesses the 
consumer’s creditworthiness on the basis of suffi cient information, where appropriate obtained from the 
consumer, and, where necessary, on the basis of a consultation of the relevant database.’
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capacities. One could argue that lenders have an incentive to assess whether the debtor 
can afford the product even in the absence of a legal requirement to do so. However, 
it has been shown that business models exist under which it is profi table for lenders to 
extend credit to debtors who very likely cannot repay (i.e. to make ‘reckless’ loans), 
contrary to the conventional perspective of minimising risk and avoiding defaults.31 
Under such conditions, it makes sense to make lenders responsible for individually 
checking the creditworthiness of the consumer and to render unaffordable credit off-
limits.
 The movement within legal scholarship, which is referred to as ‘behavioural law 
and economics’, builds on the core insights of law and economics scholarship but 
supplements it with a subtle view of how and why and when humans make mistakes in 
judgment.32 Instead of a strict adherence to rational choice theory, the new movement 
adopts a more subtle and context-dependent view of how individuals behave for the 
purpose of legal analysis. Based on the relevant decision-making capacities of actors in 
a specifi c setting, it can be used to formulate specifi c normative policies.33 For example, 
the fi nding that debtors are worse decision-makers than lenders in the borrowing context 
may be used to support specifi c rules that shift some of the responsibility for making 
appropriate borrowing decisions towards the lenders. The basic tenet of economic 
analysis, that the question of liability in cases of imperfect information should turn 
on which of the parties to the transaction can produce information and avoid mistakes 
at lower costs, remains unchallenged. A major contribution of behavioural analysis is 
to point out – based on improved accounts of how people actually behave in specifi c 
contexts – which one of the parties to a specifi c type of transaction is in the best position 
to produce correct information at the lowest cost to avoid costly mistakes in specifi c 
settings.
4 Relationships of Trust: Greater Duty to Inform
4.1 Introduction
In many legal systems, courts are more willing to relieve a party from disadvantageous 
contractual obligations if the parties are in a special relationship of trust. According to 
Article II. – 7:207 (unfair exploitation) of the Draft Common Frame of Reference:34 
‘[a] party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: (a) 
the party … had a relationship of trust with the other party …; and (b) the other party 
knew or could reasonably be expected to have known this and, given the circumstances 
and purpose of the contract, exploited the fi rst party’s situation by taking an excessive 
benefi t or grossly unfair advantage.’
 If the parties are in a special relationship of trust – a relationship such as exists 
between patient and doctor; or a client and a legal or other professional adviser – then 
any contract made between them that is disadvantageous to the weaker party is presumed 
to be due to the undue infl uence of the other party or to an abuse of the trust reposed in 
said party. 
 A strong asymmetry of information exists in trust relationships. One party is 
very well informed and the other is almost ignorant. However, this fact alone cannot 
justify the differential legal treatment of trust relationships. Information asymmetry 
between seller and buyer characterises almost all transactions. The difference with trust 
relationships is that in such relationships, the agent (adviser) is explicitly asked (and 
often paid) to give honest information. The other party (principal) is therefore entitled to 
31 R.J. Mann, ‘Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt’ (2007) University of Illinois 
Law Review 375.
32 T. Ulen, ‘The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1747-1763.
33 R. Korobkin and T. Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from 
Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051-1144.
34 Von Bar and Clive, above n. 20.
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look to the other for full and honest information and proper advice. The duty to inform 
in trust relationships is therefore much greater, and greater intervention on the basis of 
information defi ciency is warranted (see section 4.2 below).
 The duty of care resulting from the good faith obligation in agency relationships 
(section 4.3), the suitability doctrine (section 4.4) and the duty imposed upon advisers 
to inform their customers about their compensation schemes (section 4.5) may be 
understood as legal rules that provide incentives to advisers in a trust relationship to 
give more – and more honest – information, including information about the needs of 
the other party (principal).
4.2 Greater Duty to Inform in Relationships of Trust and Confi dence
Individuals often make decisions based on the advice or guidance provided by more 
informed professionals. When parties are in a special relationship of trust, the duty to 
inform should be much greater. The reason is that an adviser (agent) in a trust relationship 
is contractually bound by a greater duty to inform. In situations in which a person is quite 
helpless to protect himself, he may ‘hire’ someone with superior information to look out 
for his best interests. The person with superior knowledge (the agent) is explicitly asked 
(and often paid) to give advice on the needs of the other party (principal).
 Given the circumstances and the purpose of the contract, the adviser (agent) should 
disclose entrepreneurial information, give his honest opinion even when the information 
is non-verifi able or controversial and provide information on the principal’s needs. The 
agent in a trust relationship should determine and inform the principal about his needs, 
whether the contract provides benefi ts for which the principal is willing and able to pay 
and whether the principal is willing and able to bear the risk contained in the contract. An 
agent who fails to disclose this kind of information breaches his contractual obligations. 
Professional advisers are also bound by the rules of their deontological code to give 
honest information; it is not permitted to tell lies. This allows the principal to spend less 
time and money verifying the information given by the agent.
 The implication of the greater duty to inform is that a greater intervention on the 
basis of information defi ciencies is warranted when parties are in a trust relationship. In 
section 3.2 above, it was stated that, in general, each person is the least-cost information 
gatherer on his own needs. It follows that courts should enforce the contract when a 
person is mistaken about his own needs. This rule should be reversed when parties 
are in a trust relationship. A person who fi nds out that the contract he signed (through 
intervention of a person with whom he has a special relationship of trust) does not 
correspond with his wants and needs should be entitled to escape (part of) his contractual 
obligations. This rule sanctions the adviser (agent) in a trust relationship for failing to 
give information and advice about the needs of the other party (principal).
4.3 Good-Faith-Based Duty of Care in Agency Relationships
Financial service providers in the Netherlands have a duty of care towards their clients 
arising out of the general obligation of good faith in agency relationships. When 
fi nancial institutions advise on which fi nancial product to purchase, they have a duty 
to give honest information on the risk associated with the product, to warn customers 
that particular products may be too risky and to investigate whether the product that is 
recommended is within the customer’s risk threshold.
 In a recent Dutch case, the court in Alkmaar35 found the defendant (a bank) liable 
for non-disclosure of information on the single premium insurances that were sold to 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs went to the bank for a loan of €50,000. In addition to the 
loan, the bank sold the plaintiffs fi ve single premium insurance policies to cover the 
risk that the plaintiffs would not be able to repay the loan in case of death, disability or 
unemployment. The premiums for these policies, which amounted to €20,000 in total, 
35 Rechtbank Alkmaar, 106424, 3 February 2010.
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had to be paid up front and at once and were fi nanced by means of an additional loan. 
According to the court, a professional fi nancial service provider, like the defendant, 
should have informed the plaintiffs of the disadvantage of having to pay extra interest 
when premiums are fi nanced through an additional loan. The defendant should have 
informed the plaintiffs of possible alternatives that had no such disadvantages, like 
paying the premiums in monthly instalments. The defendant was therefore held liable 
for the losses suffered by the plaintiffs resulting from the defendant’s non-disclosure of 
information.
4.4 Suitability Doctrine
Article 19(4) of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)36 provides as 
follows: 
When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment fi rm shall obtain the necessary 
information regarding the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment fi eld 
relevant to the specifi c type of product or service, his fi nancial situation and his investment objectives so 
as to enable the fi rm to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and fi nancial 
instruments that are suitable for him.
The concept of suitability expresses a home truth about investing – investment decisions 
can be made only in light of the goals and needs of the person for whom they are made. 
Investors vary with respect to the degree of risk that they are able and willing to assume 
in their investments, and their portfolios should refl ect their differing risk thresholds. 
Consequently, a security that is suitable for one investor may be unsuitable for another. 
Imposition of any suitability doctrine has a revolutionary fl avour, because it shifts the 
responsibility for making inappropriate investment decisions from the customer to the 
broker-dealer.
 When a broker-dealer recommends a security to a customer, he has a responsibility 
to determine that the security he recommended is within a particular customer’s risk 
threshold. This implies that the broker-dealer must consider: (1) whether the security 
satisfi es the individual customer’s risk preferences or willingness to bear risk (i.e. 
investment objective); and (2) whether the risk is one which the investor has the capacity 
or ability to bear, notwithstanding customer preferences and desires.
 With suitability being defi ned with respect to both the willingness and capacity of the 
customer to bear risk, the broker-dealer must obtain complete information about each 
customer’s investment objective and fi nancial background, including his other security 
investments, his home, savings account, job prospects and other signifi cant non-security 
assets and liabilities.
 According to Mundheim, the theory on which any doctrine of suitability must rest 
(and which limits its applicability) is that customers tend to rely on their broker-dealer: 
‘The broker-dealer community has made the investing public aware that it has the 
special skills needed to deal with such intricate merchandise as securities, and the public 
has been encouraged to – and has – relied on the superior skills of the broker-dealer 
community in its securities transactions.’37
 It is not proposed that the law absolutely prohibits a broker from selling a security that 
would not be within the particular customer’s risk threshold. If an investor persisted in 
requesting such a security, the broker is permitted to make the sale, provided that he fi rst 
warns the investor that the purchase is dangerous and imprudent. Cohen states that the 
requirement to warn customers about purchases that would result in imprudent levels of 
risk would increase the fl ow of information available to the investor and protect against 
the hazards of high-pressure security salesmanship: ‘Investment in securities can be 
fantastically complicated and technical for the lay investor, and brokers typically exert 
36 Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on Markets in Financial instruments (MiFID), OJ 2004 L 145/1.
37 R. Mundheim, ‘Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine’ (1965) Duke 
Law Journal 445 at 450.
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a great infl uence over customers’ investment choices. Without a compulsory warning, 
a customer may be infl uenced by his broker to express a preference for a risk which he 
does not fully understand and which he is not really willing to undertake.’38
 The recommendation of a particular security to a particular customer involves an 
exercise of judgment by the broker-dealer at the time of the sale. The suitability standard 
should not be a vehicle for second-guessing the judgments of broker-dealers. According 
to Mundheim, a broker-dealer should only be found to have violated his responsibility 
if no reasoning broker would have recommended the particular security to the particular customer in light 
of information about the customer which the broker-dealer knew or should have known. This review must 
be made in the light of the circumstances which existed at the time the recommendation was made. Price 
information of the security after it was purchased – whether favorable or unfavorable – should be irrelevant 
in determining whether the recommendation was suitable when made.39 
The suitability doctrine would be an invitation for disappointed customers to benefi t 
from the ‘positive’ risks associated with their investment but to shift ‘negative’ risks 
towards their broker-dealers, if price information on the security after it was purchased 
was relevant in determining whether the recommendation was suitable when made.
4.5 The Duty to Inform about Compensation Schemes
Article 26(b)(1) of Directive 2006/73/EC specifi es that ‘investment fi rms must disclose 
to the client the existence, nature and amount of the fee, commission or benefi t paid 
or provided to or by a third party, in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and 
understandable prior to the provision of the relevant investment or ancillary service.’40 
The Dutch legislator has mandated disclosure of the commission paid to all intermediaries 
who sell complex fi nancial products (including insurance intermediaries and mortgage 
brokers).41
 In general, the law does not require sellers to disclose information about their 
compensation scheme. Under the economic duty-to-inform doctrine, the same result 
would be obtained because such information is entrepreneurial or because the cost of 
communicating information about the compensation scheme is higher than the value 
of that information to the buyer. Buyers can usually make an informed choice when 
they have information on the price and quality of a product or service. How much a 
salesperson earns on the sale of the product is usually irrelevant to the quality of the 
buyer’s purchase decision.
 How can a duty to inform about compensation schemes be justifi ed? For cases in 
which buyers rely on the seller’s superior information to give advice on the purchase 
decision, the seller’s objectivity and independence are critical for the quality of the 
buyer’s purchase decision. However, particular compensation schemes may cause 
pervasive confl icts of interest. In business involving an adviser-advisee relationship, 
confl icts of interest may compromise the adviser’s objectivity and independence.
 There are many different types of compensation system for intermediaries, but the 
great majority of advised products and services are sold on the basis of commission (i.e. 
commission-based advice). Commission can be defi ned as a payment to an intermediary 
conditional on the purchase of the product. The payments are usually made by the product 
provider to the intermediary. The consumer pays indirectly for the advice through higher 
prices (higher premiums in case of insurance or higher interest rates in case of loans) 
paid to the product provider. Moreover, consumers only pay for the advice when they 
effectively buy the product. A person who obtains advice but subsequently decides not 
to buy the product obtains the advice for free. However, there is no such thing as a ‘free 
lunch’. Advisers get compensation for the ‘wasted’ advice costs from those buyers who 
do buy the product, as they pay higher prices. An alternative compensation system is the 
38 S. Cohen, ‘The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory’ (1971) 80 Yale Law Journal 1604 at 1622.
39 Mundheim, above n. 37, at 474-475.
40 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions 
for investment fi rms and defi ned terms for the purposes of that Directive, OJ 2006 L 241/26.
41 Besluit Gedragstoezicht fi nanciële ondernemingen Wft.
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fee-based system. Under this system, the buyer always pays for the advice, whether or 
not he subsequently decides to buy the product. The fee may be a fi xed fee or an hourly 
fee for advice.
 Whereas the fees paid directly by the customers do not affect the recommendations, 
commissions do affect recommendations. With commission-based advice, there is a risk 
of biased advice. Advice can be biased in three different ways.
 The fi rst type of bias is product bias. In advising across a range of product types, 
advisers recommend a product type that provides them with the highest commission 
even though the product type does not fi t best with the needs of the customer. The second 
type of bias is provider bias. Within a particular product type, advisers recommend the 
provider that pays them the highest commission even though other providers’ products 
offer better terms to the consumer. The third type of bias is sales bias. Commission 
provides incentives for intermediaries to sell a product, even when the ‘best’ advice 
might be not to purchase or to continue holding on to the product. This sales bias results 
from the intrinsic feature of commission-based advice that advisers only get paid for 
their advice when they actually sell the product. This may induce them to selectively 
disclose information (e.g. to hide bad information on the product) in order to effectuate 
the sale.
 Safeguards to ensure the objectivity of advice may be needed to reduce biases in 
advice. One possible measure is to impose upon advisers a duty to inform their customers 
about their compensation schemes. Disclosure affords a forewarning of biased advice, 
and advisees may adjust for the bias. Some authors cast doubts on the effectiveness of 
disclosure in reducing adviser’s bias.42 Advisees may not adequately adjust for the bias. 
Additional safeguards to ensure the objectivity of advice, such as regulation of the way 
compensation schemes are structured, may therefore be needed.
5 Judicial Control of Contract Terms: Inequality of Bargaining Power
5.1 Inequality of Bargaining Power
The notion of inequality of bargaining power in the market for contracts pervades 
discussions about the regulation of contract terms for reasons of fairness.43 The question 
arises whether it is still right to treat freedom of contract as a central pillar of the legal 
system. Should it not be limited ex lege wherever the parties to a contract are unequal 
in bargaining power, ‘parity of contract’ is disturbed and the weaker party needs 
protection? Is it not time to replace or supplement the principle of freedom of contract 
with a principle of ‘contractual justice’? Under such a principle, there should be equality 
in contracts as regards knowledge of the facts, in the exchange itself and in the subject 
matter of the contract for contracts to be valid and enforceable. Courts would be required 
to set aside contracts (or contractual terms) that were unequal or unfair.
 A general legal requirement for the terms of a contract to be fair, so that they will be 
legally unenforceable if they are not, interferes with freedom of contract. The principle 
of freedom of contract rests on the assumption that each person is the best judge of 
what he wants and is willing and able to pay for. A person who enters on a voluntary 
basis into an agreement will surrender only as much as he is willing to give in order to 
obtain in exchange something he values more. It is assumed that people only agree to 
terms that leave them better off. If consent can be observed, it can be inferred that the 
contract enhances value. When a person who enters into a contract does so of his own 
free will and is capable of looking after his own interests, it is the responsibility of each 
person to act with prudence and to decide for himself on the price and other terms on 
which he is prepared to purchase. It is the agreement, as reached by two parties entering 
into a contract with a proper understanding of the bargain they are making, which then 
42 D. Cain, G.F. Loewenstein, and D.A. Moore, ‘The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects on Confl icts 
of Interest’ (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies 1.; D. Schwarcz, ‘Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning 
Contingent Commissions’ (2006) 25 Yale Law & Policy Review 289.
43 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 331.
 THE ROLE OF INFORMATION DEFICIENCIES IN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 85
determines the price and the other terms of the exchange – and nothing else. If the 
meaning of a clause is clear, the principle of freedom of contract requires that it must be 
applied and that the courts have no power to relieve one party of its clearly expressed 
obligations. If a courts declared void a particular contractual arrangement on the grounds 
that it was substantively unfair according to the fairness standard used, future parties for 
whom this particular arrangement is value-maximising would no longer be able to adopt 
it.
 Moreover, widespread judicial scrutiny of contract terms may interfere with 
the principle of individual autonomy of which the freedom of contract principle 
is a manifestation. A rational person capable of determining his fate must be given 
the freedom to shape his life responsibly. He must be allowed to decide for himself 
whether or not to make a contract, towards whom he will undertake a legally recognised 
obligation and what the content must be. States, and by extension courts, should 
protect the freedom of the individual and safeguard his power of self-determination. 
The normative justifi cation for courts to enforce contractual obligations is that they are 
‘willed’ by the parties. Under judicial scrutiny, on the other hand, the court substitutes 
its judgment for that of the individuals involved.
 In the case of inequality of bargaining power, however, courts and legislators express 
their doubts that the contract contains terms that the parties want and desire. In this 
case, it is presumed that the stronger party will force terms on parties that do not want 
them. From this point of view, the contract terms gain their effectiveness not from 
the private autonomy of the parties but from the submission of one party. Such terms 
must therefore be denied effectiveness if they contradict the principle of good faith 
and fairness. Contract terms are thought to be suspect and intervention is deemed to be 
necessary whenever terms are agreed without any negotiations at all and in cases where 
one of the parties does not have any infl uence on the terms of the deal. This is the way in 
which contracts are often concluded today. The need for judicial and regulatory control 
of standard form contracts became apparent when business organisations of all types, 
suppliers of goods, insurance companies and banks had developed standard contract 
conditions that deviate from the default rules and seriously disadvantage consumers. It 
was assumed, at least in consumer settings, that deviations from the legal default rules 
in standard form contracts are not based on the free will of the contracting parties but 
that they are the result of inequality of bargaining power. In a contract based on standard 
terms, there must therefore be some kind of justifi cation for a departure from the legal 
default rules.
 Economists, on the other hand, argue that inappropriate terms in standard form 
contracts are not the result of unequal bargaining power. Rather, ineffi cient contract 
clauses result from the failure of customers to read or understand the content of the 
contract.44 The use of standard form contracts is typically characterised by imperfect 
information on the part of some of the parties to those contracts. The failure to read 
standard form contracts may be the result of a rational decision to save on transaction 
costs. However, the supplier of standard form contracts may exploit this fact by inserting 
ineffi cient clauses into the contract. The behavioural account of standard form contracts 
assumes that buyers, when confronted with standard form contracts, only compare a 
limited number of product and contract attributes when contemplating purchase, because 
they are boundedly rational rather than fully rational decision-makers.45 As a result, 
competition between sellers will generate an effi cient level of quality for the attributes 
that buyers consider (‘salient attributes’) but low levels of quality for ‘non-salient’ 
attributes. For all propositions (unequal bargaining power, failure to read or bounded 
rationality), the legal implications are much the same: courts should be cautious about 
enforcing standard form contracts.
44 M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993).
45 R. Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability’ (2003) 70 
University of Chicago Law Review 1203.
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5.2 An Economic View of the Unequal Bargaining Power Argument for 
Judicial Control
The notion of inequality of bargaining power is an intuitive idea, but one that deserves 
careful examination in order to assess whether it could account for the prevalence of 
unfair contract terms. Several variants of inequality of bargaining power exist, including: 
(1) monopoly power; (2) differences in wealth between the parties; and (3) standard 
contract terms offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
 Inequality of bargaining power may exist in a monopolistic market. When only 
one fi rm sells products in a particular market, it is called a monopolist. When trading 
partners are limited, bargains can be very one-sided. Faced with no alternatives, buyers 
have no choice but to accept the terms determined by the monopolist. Monopolists are 
able to charge higher prices, that is to say, monopoly prices, when no other suppliers 
are competing for customers. Inequality that stems from monopoly power would be 
a market failure, except that (a) fi rms are rarely monopolist and (b) even if they are, 
one cannot possibly account for the prevalence of unfair contract terms (i.e. harsh 
non-price terms) by reference to that monopoly power. The second point needs further 
clarifi cation. A rational monopolist also has an incentive to offer the contract terms that 
parties desire, because in doing so it can maximise its profi ts.46 The party with market 
power will offer terms if the other parties want them, but will not force terms on parties 
that do not want them. The reason that monopolists offer the terms that parties want is 
that they can charge a fee for it. The fee or price increase compensates the monopolists 
for the costs of offering the terms, and the customers accept the fee or price increase 
because the benefi ts of the terms are higher than the fee they have to pay for them. 
The ineffi ciency of a monopoly lies in the price, not in the quality of the products or 
the contract clauses. This theoretical claim has been supported by empirical evidence. 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler has analysed software licence agreements drawn from many 
distinct segments of the software industry to empirically investigate the relationship 
between competitive conditions and the quality of standard form contracts. She has 
found little evidence for the concern that fi rms with market power, as measured by 
market concentration or market share, require consumers to accept particularly one-
sided contract terms. In other words, fi rms in both concentrated and unconcentrated 
segments of the software market, and fi rms with large and small market shares, offer 
similar terms to consumers.47
 Inequality of bargaining power may also be thought to exist when one contracting 
party is wealthier than the other contracting party. With their superior bargaining power, 
fi rms are able to ‘outbid’ customers for contract terms. Because customers need money 
more than fi rms, they may accept particular contract terms in return for a price decrease. 
For example, a debtor might be willing to accept a harsh remedial term in return for a 
lower interest rate. If this is the sense in which inequality of bargaining power is thought 
to exist between sellers and buyers, it demonstrates not market failure but market 
success. A market is successful when it moves resources from lower-valued to higher-
valued uses. In order to increase wealth, parties must have different endowments, and 
this suggests that the parties to a contract generally will have unequal bargaining power.
 Finally, inequality of bargaining power may be said to exist when the contract is 
from its inception an act of submission to a take-it-or-leave-it standard form contract 
with no possibility to negotiate its terms. Regulation of standard form contracts is 
based on the argument that standard contract terms – those offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis with no opportunity for negotiation – are suffi ciently suspect to satisfy 
the unequal bargaining proposition. In this respect, take-it-or-leave-it agreements are 
sometimes called ‘contracts of adhesion’ to refl ect the lack of bargaining power.48 Under 
a traditional law and economics analysis, however, the adhesive or standardised nature 
46 A. Schwartz, ‘A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability’ (1977) 63 Virginia Law Review 
1053 at 1071-1076.
47 F. Marotta-Wurgler, ‘Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software 
License Agreements’ (2008) 5 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 447.
48 F. Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia 
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of the contract does not make it suspect. Standard form contracts are the equivalent of 
standardised products. Most products in modern markets are standardised. For example, 
all refrigerators are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; you cannot ask the producer 
to design and produce a unique refrigerator, like a four-door refrigerator.49 The take-it-
or-leave-it characteristic does not make the consumer uninterested in information about 
the quality of the goods. The consumer may still decide whether to spend money on that 
product or on another one (either a similar product from a competitor or a different type 
of product). Consumers may equally decide whether to accept the standard terms of one 
supplier or those of another one. If one supplier offers unattractive terms, a competing 
supplier wanting to attract customers, will offer more attractive terms.
 Economists conclude that unequal bargaining power, in its different variants, cannot 
account for the prevalence of unfair contract terms. This is not to say that unfair contract 
terms do not exist. The claim made by economists is simply that they are not the result 
of unequal bargaining power. Their existence is the result of something else. That 
something else is the signing-without-reading problem, which is the subject of the next 
section.
6 Judicial Control of Contract Terms: The Signing-Without-Reading 
Problem
6.1 Introduction
Contract law provides a set of default rules that apply unless parties have agreed explicit 
terms to the contrary. While default terms may be effi cient for the majority of contracting 
parties, a minority of parties may be better off adopting explicit terms that deviate from 
the default rule. Parties are free to decide on their own terms, and freedom of contract 
requires courts to enforce the explicit terms of the contract.
 However, courts do not always enforce the explicit terms of the contract. They may 
refuse to enforce terms that seem unfair. For example, Article II. – 9:403 DCFR states 
that ‘in a contract between a business and a consumer, a term [which has not been 
individually negotiated] is unfair … if it is supplied by the business and if it signifi cantly 
disadvantages the consumer, contrary to good faith and fair dealing.’ An unfair term 
is not binding on the party that did not supply it (Article II. – 9:409 DCFR). Under 
the DCFR, courts may set aside a contract term that signifi cantly disadvantages the 
consumer in comparison with the default rule that would otherwise be applicable, unless 
it can be shown that the (disadvantageous) deviation from the default rule is justifi ed 
and not contrary to good faith and fair dealing.50 Judicial control is also possible in the 
case of contract terms between parties that are not businesses (Article II. – 9:404 DCFR) 
and in the case of contract terms between businesses (Article II. – 9:405 DCFR), but 
different fairness criteria apply than in the case of contracts between a business and a 
consumer.
 The economic theory on which judicial control and regulation of contract terms rests 
is that people have a tendency to sign contracts without reading them. The following 
sections outline the causes of the signing-without-reading problem (section 6.2), the 
ineffi ciencies resulting from it (section 6.3) and its implications for the standard of 
judicial control, the scope of its applicability and the form of legislative action (section 
6.4).
Law Review 629; T.D. Rakoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ (1983) 96 Harvard 
Law Review 1174.
49 Schwartz, above n. 46, at 1069.
50 Von Bar and Clive, above n. 20, at. 635. The rules on unfair terms in the DCFR are modelled on 
Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993 L 095.
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6.2 The Signing-Without-Reading Problem
In an ideal world, people would read contracts before they sign them. In the real 
world, however, few people do so. And those that do read contracts often do not fully 
understand them. Not knowing the terms of the contract is a special form of information 
asymmetry. One party is not fully informed about the content of the contract, whereas 
the other party, usually the drafter of the contract, knows the exact terms of the contract.
 At fi rst sight, the solution to this type of information problem is simple. In most cases, 
misunderstandings can be avoided by reading the contract. The law could therefore 
insist that parties should read contracts before signing them and sanction parties that 
neglect to do so. The sanction could consist of acting as if they had read all the contract 
terms and had consented to them by signing the contract. This implies that courts would 
not invalidate contracts (or contract terms) when one party was not informed because 
of its failure to read the content. This sanction would create an incentive to read before 
signing.
 In reality, the problem is more complex. Reading contracts costs time, and time 
(given the concept of opportunity costs) is money. Since rational parties balance the 
costs and benefi ts of reading documents, it can be rational not to read. However, if 
the drafters of the contract know that some parties will not read the document before 
signing it, they can abuse that fact and incorporate unfair clauses that benefi t the drafters 
at the expense of the signers.51
6.3 Ineffi ciencies Resulting from the Signing-Without-Reading Problem
The signing-without-reading problem causes several ineffi ciencies.52 First, ineffi cient 
clauses are adopted in the contract. An ineffi cient clause creates higher costs for one 
party (the signer) than it brings benefi ts to the other party (the drafter). Second, in the 
case of signing-without-reading, the same market failures may occur as in the case of 
asymmetric information on the quality of the goods. Akerlof explains how asymmetric 
information on the quality of goods may lead to adverse selection, meaning that good 
quality products may be driven from the market by bad quality products.53 The same 
process may evolve when buyers are not informed of the content of the contract. 
Goldberg argues that because the majority of consumers do not notice good contract 
clauses, harsh-term, low-price contracts will drive out effi cient ones, even in competitive 
markets.54 Finally, consumers who do not trust sellers may either stop buying goods 
because of the risk that ineffi cient terms are adopted in the contract or may spend too 
much effort on reading contracts to avoid being bound by ineffi cient contract terms.
 Market forces are not strong enough to solve the signing-without-reading problem. 
Schwartz and Wilde55 are optimistic that informed shoppers will be able to discipline the 
market. Consumers who lack information have incentives to acquire information. Some 
consumers will acquire information more easily than others; these are the people who 
read standard form contracts. However, the other consumers can free-ride on the efforts 
of the fi rst group. If sellers cannot easily distinguish between informed and uninformed 
consumers, they cannot exploit the latter by including ineffi cient terms in their contract. 
51 G. De Geest, ‘The Signing-Without-Reading Problem: An Analysis of the European Directive on 
Unfair Contract Terms’, in H. Schäfer and J. Lwowski (eds.), Konsequenzen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen 
(2002) 213 at 214.
52 Id., at 217-218.
53 G. Akerlof, ‘The Markets for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.
54 V. Goldberg ‘Institutional Change and the Quasi-Visible Hand’ (1974) 17 Journal of Law and Economics 
461.
55 A. Schwartz and L. Wilde, ‘Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis?’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 630.
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However, Gazal has shown that we can only expect effi cient standard form contracts in 
markets in very implausible situations.56
6.4 Solutions for the Signing-Without-Reading Problem
6.4.1 Judicial Control of Contractual Terms
Asymmetric information on the terms included in the contract cannot be solved by 
increasing the amount of information obtained by consumers on the content of the 
contract. As noted above, information could be increased if consumers would read the 
contract, but a duty-to-read is too costly a solution. An entitlement to avoid the contract 
when a consumer can show that he was mistaken about the content of the contract due 
to signing without reading, similar to the doctrine of mistake, would also be diffi cult to 
implement. It is very diffi cult to prove a signing-without-reading problem in a direct way. 
Instead, substantive regulation of the content of contracts terms through judicial control 
is justifi ed in this case as an implicit evidence rule. How can a signing-without-reading 
problem be inferred from the terms of the contract? The fact that the contract contains a 
term that informed and rational parties would never accept is implicit evidence that one 
of the contracting parties did not read or understand the contract.57 What terms would 
informed and rational parties never accept? These are terms that do not enhance the joint 
value of the contracting parties or ineffi cient terms. Examples include terms of which 
the costs to one party are much higher than the benefi ts they bring to the other party. In 
such cases, the value decrease to one party is larger than the value increase to the other 
party, resulting in a net reduction of total value. Under an effi ciency approach to the 
standard for judicial control, courts would set aside contract terms that do not enhance 
the joint value of contracting parties.
6.4.2 Which Terms Should Be Subjected to Judicial Control?
The economic rationale for judicial control of contract terms is the signing-without-
reading problem. It follows that such control should be confi ned to terms that people 
lack incentive to read or pay attention to. There is no need for judicial control of contract 
terms for which no signing-without-reading problem exists. It is diffi cult to prove the 
absence of a signing-without-reading problem, but its absence may be inferred on the 
basis of substantive or procedural evidence. Substantive evidence relates to the substance 
of clauses, whereas procedural evidence relates to the circumstances of contracting.
 Procedural evidence of the absence of a signing-without-reading problem exists when 
the contract term was clearly individually negotiated. People obviously pay attention to 
the terms that they negotiate on an individual basis. However, even when terms are 
individually negotiated (in which case it may be assumed that people read the contract 
before signing), some people may not fully understand what they read. This is the 
signing-without-understanding problem. For example, people may not fully understand 
the legal consequences of a clause. Evidence of the absence of signing-of-understanding 
problems exists when the terms are drafted in plain and intelligible language.58 Terms 
that have been drafted in advance (whether or not as part of a standard contract) are 
not individually negotiated. For such terms, signing-without-reading problems may 
be presumed, unless make-read techniques are so obviously attention-attracting (e.g. 
with very clear warnings) that the consumer must have been aware of the clause before 
signing.
56 O. Gazal, ‘Economic Analysis of Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts’, Erasmus Programme in 
Law and Economics Discussion Papers on Law and Economics No. 100 (1999).
57 De Geest, above n. 51, at 225.
58 Compare with Article II. – 9:402(1) DCFR (duty of transparency in terms not individually negotiated): 
‘A person who supplies terms which have not been individually negotiated has a duty to ensure that they 
are drafted and communicated in plain, intelligible language.’
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 Substantive evidence of the absence of a signing-without-reading problem exists for 
the subject matter of the contract and the price-related terms.59 These are aspects that 
people take into account when buying a product or service. Finally, there is no need to 
check the fairness of terms that deviate from the default rules when the drafter’s costs 
of the deviation from the default rule are higher than his costs under the default rule. 
In this case, the drafter will have to charge a higher price than competitors who apply 
the default rule or deviate from the default rule in a way that is less costly to them. 
Uninformed consumers pay attention to prices (salient terms) but not to other terms 
(non-salient terms). Hence, uninformed consumers choose the contract with the lowest 
price. The fact that people choose the more expensive contract is substantive evidence 
that they are informed about the content of the contract, otherwise they would not choose 
it.60 There is no signing-without-reading problem with respect to more expensive terms, 
which offer more protection to consumers than the default rules.
6.4.3 Legislative Action: Black Lists and Grey Lists
Legislators have developed lists of contract terms that may be regarded as unfair. There 
are two types of lists: black lists and grey lists.
 Clauses that are put on the black list are considered unfair in all circumstances. They 
are always prohibited. From an economic perspective, it is appropriate to put contract 
terms that are ineffi cient in all circumstances on the black list. Examples of such terms 
include terms ‘giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or 
services supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right 
to interpret any term in the contract.’ Such terms allow the supplier to play the role of 
judge. The supplier, however, is not a neutral judge. He has an incentive to change the 
terms in his own favour. Rational parties would never accept such clauses.61
 When clauses are ineffi cient for one group of consumers and effi cient for another 
group, determining the optimal policy is more complex. According to De Geest: 
‘Restricting contractual freedom, on the one hand, leads to social losses by not allowing 
a minority of consumers to adopt clauses that are effi cient to them. Allowing contractual 
freedom, on the other hand, leads to social losses by introducing signing-without-reading 
problems.’62 The best policy option according to De Geest is to adopt a grey list of 
suspicious clauses. These clauses are void in principle, unless there is evidence of true 
consent. Evidence of true consent may exist when the contract was clearly individually 
negotiated (and the terms are drafted in plain and intelligible language) or when the 
make-read techniques are so obviously attention-attracting (e.g. a very clear warning) 
that the consumer must have been aware of the clause before signing the contract. 
 An example of terms that may be put on the grey list are those ‘inappropriately 
excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier or 
another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance 
by the seller or supplier of any of the contracting obligations.’ Such terms are ineffi cient 
for most contracting parties because they give sub-optimal incentives to the supplier to 
perform his obligations, but may be effi cient for some parties when, for some reason, 
the consumer is in the best position to bear the risks of the supplier’s non-performance. 
To ensure that these terms are only part of the contract between parties for whom they 
are effi cient, they should only be enforced when evidence of true consent exists in one 
of the ways mentioned above.
59 Compare with Article II. – 9:406(2) DCFR (exclusions from unfairness test): ‘For contract terms which 
are drafted in plain and intelligible language, the unfairness test extends neither to the defi nition of the main 
subject matter of the contract, nor to the adequacy of the price to be paid.’
60 De Geest, above n. 51, at 227.
61 Id., at 232-233.
62 Id., at 226.
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7 Conclusions
Information defi ciencies play an important role in contract enforcement. Courts 
frequently refuse to enforce contracts when one of the parties lacks information. In 
that way, a person who lacks information is able to shift the consequences to the other 
party. When is it appropriate to shift responsibility for information defi ciencies from one 
contracting party to the other?
 From an economic perspective, it is appropriate to impose liability on the seller 
when he can produce, convey or obtain the pertinent information at lower cost, unless 
the information is entrepreneurial, non-verifi able, already known to the buyer or not 
valuable for the buyer. The buyer, on the other hand, should bear responsibility for 
information defi ciencies related to his own needs, unless contracting parties are in special 
relationship of trust. In most cases, people are in the best position to know what their 
own needs are. It is accordingly the responsibility of each person to act with prudence 
and invest a certain amount of cognitive effort to ensure that he has thought through his 
options and selected a product that best meets his needs and desires.In a relationship 
of trust, on the other hand, the adviser (agent) is contractually bound by a greater duty 
to inform, including a duty to give information and advice about the principal’s needs. 
Greater intervention on the basis of information defi ciencies is therefore warranted for 
trust relationships.
 It is not within the aim of this article to conduct a thorough analysis of existing national 
laws and doctrines with a view to determining whether they allocate responsibilities for 
information defi ciencies in similar ways as economically-inspired rules and doctrines 
would. Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis of the DCFR and European regulation on 
fi nancial transactions reveals that they provide outcomes that largely correspond to 
those implied by economic analysis.
 The economic theory of judicial or legal regulation of contract terms rests on the 
tendency of people to sign contracts without reading them. The implications of this 
theory are that courts should set aside (or legislators should prohibit) contract terms that 
rational, informed parties would never accept but that judicial control is unwarranted in 
cases where substantive or procedural evidence exists that there is no signing-without-
reading problem.

